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HATE SPEECH IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Michel Rosenfeld* 
INTRODUCTION 
Hate speech—^that is, speech designed to promote hatred on 
the basis of race, religion, ethnicity or national origin—eposes 
vexing and complex problems for contemporary constitutional 
rights to freedom of expression.^ The constitutional treatment of 
these problems, moreover, has been far from uniform as the 
boundaries between impermissible propagation of hatred and 
protected speech vary from one setting to the next. There is, 
however, a big divide between the United States and other 
Western democracies. In the United States, hate speech is given 
wide constitutional protection while under international human 
rights covenants^ and in other Western democracies, such as 
Canada,^ Germany," and the United Kingdom,' it is largely 
prohibited and subjected to criminal sanctions. 
The contrasting approaches adopted by the United States and 
other Western democracies afford a special opportunity to embark 
on a comparative analysis of the difficult problems posed by hate 
speech and of the various possible solutions to them. As we shall 
see, in the United States, hate speech and the best ways to cope 
with it are conceived differently than in other Western 
* Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights, Benjamin N. Cardozo School 
of Law. I wish to thank Norman Dorsen for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 I use the term "constitutional rights" in a broad sense that encompasses both rights 
arising imder national constitutions and those established by international human rights 
covenants, notwithstanding that, strictly speaking, the latter may be treaty based rights 
rather than constitutional rights. 
2 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
3 See discussion infra Part III. A. 
^ See discussion infra Part III.C. 
5 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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democracies. This is due, in part, to differences in social context, 
and, in part, to differences in approach. It may be tempting, 
therefore, to endorse a purely contextual approach to hate speech 
encompassing a broad array of diverse constitutional responses 
ranging from American laissez faire to German vigilance. Given 
the trend toward globalization and the instant transnational reach 
of the internet, however, a purely contextual approach would seem 
insufficient if not downright inadequate. For example, much Neo-
Nazi propaganda is now generated in California and transmitted 
through the internet to countries like Canada or Germany where 
Neo-Nazi groups have established a much more significant 
foothold than in the United States.® In as much as such 
propaganda generally amounts to protected speech in the United 
States, there seems to be little that can be done to limit its spread 
beyond American soil. Does that justify calling for a change of 
constitutional jurisprudence in the United States? Or, more 
generally, do present circumstances warrant a systematic 
rethinking of constitutional approaches to hate speech? 
In this Article I will concentrate on these questions through a 
comparison of different existing constitutional approaches to hate 
speech. Before embarking on such a comparison, however, I will 
provide in Part I a brief overview of some of the most salient issues 
surrounding the constitutional treatment of hate speech. In the 
next two parts, I will examine the two principal contrasting 
constitutional approaches to hate speech. Part II will focus on the 
United States and analyze hate speech within the broader free 
speech jurisprudence under the American Constitution. Part III 
will deal with the alternative approach developed in other Western 
democracies and largely endorsed in the relevant international 
covenants. Finally, Part IV will compare the two contrasting 
approaches and explore how best to deal with hate speech as a 
problem for contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. 
® See B'NAI B'RITH ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE SKINHEAD 
INTERNATIONAL; A WORLDWIDE SURVEY OF NEO-NAZI SKINHEADS, (Irwin Suall ed., 
1995); Robert A. Jordan, Spreading Hatred, THE BOSTON GLOBE, NOV. 26, 1988, at 25; 
Paul Geitner, Noting Neo-Nazi Material, Internet Blocks Site, THE CHATTANOOGA 
TIMES, Jan. 27,1996, at A8. See also UEJF & LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc. & Yahoo! France, 
T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000 (holding that the display and auction of Nazi paraphernalia 
over the internet in France amounts to criminal violation, and is not protected speech). 
The French court order ordering Yahoo! to pay plaintiffs 10,000 Francs and to make it 
impossible for French internet users to view Nazi items on Yahoo's auction cite was held 
unenforceable in the United States on First Amendment grounds. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La 
Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181,1186 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
2003] HATE SPEECH 1525 
I. HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; 
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 
The regulation of hate speech is largely a post World War II 
phenomenon.^ Prompted by the obvious hnks between racist 
propaganda and the Holocaust, various international covenants'* as 
well as individual countries such as Germany,' and in the decade 
immediately following the war the United States,*" excluded hate 
speech from the scope of constitutionally protected expression. 
Viewed from the particular perspective of a rejection of the Nazi 
experience and an attempt to prevent its resurgence, the 
suppression of hate speech seems both obvious and commendable. 
Current encounters with hate speech, however, are for the 
most part far removed from the Nazi case. Whereas in Nazi 
Germany hate speech was perpetrated by the government as part 
of its official ideology and policy, in contemporary democracies it 
is by and large opponents of the government and, in a wide 
majority of cases, members of marginalized groups with no 
realistic hopes of achieving political power who engage in hate 
speech. Moreover, in some cases those punished for engaging in 
hate speech have been members of groups long victimized by 
racist policies and rhetoric, prosecuted for uttering race based 
invectives against those whom they perceive as their racist 
oppressors. Thus, for example, it is ironic that the first person 
convicted under the United Kingdom's Race Relations Law 
criminalizing hate speech was a black man who uttered a racial 
epithet against a white policeman.** 
Like Nazi racist propaganda, some of the straightforward 
racist invectives heard today are crude and unambiguous. 
Contemporary hate speech cannot be confined, however, to racist 
^ See Friedrich Kiibler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech? Transnational Aspects 
of a Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335,336 (1998). 
® See, e.g.. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 20(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978) (entered into 
force Mar. 23, 1976) (stating that "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or reUgjous hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by 
law"). 
' For a discussion of the extensive German regulation against hate sp>eech, see Kiibler, 
supra note 7, at 340-47. 
See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding the constitutionality of a 
statue criminalizing group defamation based on race or religion). Although Beauhamais 
has never been formally repudiated by the Supreme Court, it is fundamentally inconsistent 
with more recent decisions on the subject. See discussion infra Part II. 
" See Anthony SkiUen, Freedom of Speech, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: RADICAL STUDIES 139,142 (Keith Graham ed., 1982). 
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insults. Precisely because of the strong post-Holocaust constraints 
against raw public expressions of racial hatred, present day racists 
often feel compelled to couch their racist message in more subtle 
ways. For example, anti-Semites may engage in Holocaust denial 
or minimizing under the guise of weighing in on an ongoing 
historians' debate. Or, they may attack Zionism in order to blur 
the boundaries between what might qualify as a genuine debate 
concerning political ideology and what is pure and simple anti-
Semitism. Similarly, American racists have on occasion resorted 
to what appears to be a scientific debate or invoked certain 
statistics—such as those indicating that proportionately blacks 
commit more crimes than whites—^to promote their prejudices 
under the disguise of formulating political positions informed by 
scientific fact or theory. 
Even these few observations suffice to establish that not all 
contemporary instances of hate speech are alike. Any assessment 
of whether, how, or how much, hate speech ought to be prohibited 
must, therefore, account for certain key variables: namely who and 
what are involved and where and under what circumstances these 
cases arise. 
The who is always plural, for it encompasses not only the 
speaker who utters a statement that constitutes hate speech, but 
the target of that statement and the audience to whom the 
statement in question is addressed—^which may be limited to the 
target, may include both the target and others, or may be limited 
to an audience that does not include any member of the target 
group.^^ Moreover, as already mentioned, not all speakers are 
alike. This is not only because of group affiliation. Thus, in the 
The identity of the audience involved may be relevant for a variety of reasons, 
including assessing the harm produced by hate speech, and devising effective legal means 
to combat hate speech. For example, demeaning racist propaganda aimed at a non-target 
audience may be a necessary step in the creation of a political environment wherein 
policies of genocide might plausibly be implemented. See generally GORDON W. 
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). Thus, the German people might never 
have countenanced the Nazi policy of extermination of the Jews, had they not been 
desensitized through years of vicious anti-Semitic propaganda. See FRANKLYN S. 
HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 87 (1981). Consistent with this, hate 
speech directed at a non-target audience might well be much more dangerous than if 
exclusively addressed to a target-group audience. 
From the standpoint of devising workable legal responses, the differences between 
different speakers and different target group audiences may also be very important. For 
example, in the United States where hate groups like the Neo-Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan 
are relatively marginalized and lack major financial means, allowing private tort suits by 
affected members of the relevant target groups may lead to expensive verdicts with 
crippling effects on the hate group's ability to function. See Klansmen Sued over Shooting 
at S.C. Nightclub, THE ATLANTA J. CONST., NOV. 1,1998, at 6A (reporting crippling effect 
on Ku Klux Klan of a $37.8 million verdict over a church fire). 
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context of dominant majority group hate speech against a 
vulnerable and discriminated against minority, the impact of the 
hate speech in question is likely to differ significantly depending 
on whether it is uttered by a high government official or an 
important opposition leader or whether it is propaganda by a 
marginalized outsider group with no credibility." Furthermore, 
even the same speaker may have to be treated differently, or at 
least may have a different impact which ought to be considered 
legally relevant, depending on whom is the target of his or her hate 
message. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that black hate 
speech against whites in the United States is not the equivalent of 
white hate speech against blacks, what about black anti-Semitism? 
Ought it be considered as yet another instance of black (albeit 
inappropriate) response to white oppression?" Or as an assault 
against a vulnerable minority? In other words, is black anti-
Semitism but one aspect of a comprehensible resentment harbored 
by blacks against whites? Or is it but a means for blacks to carve 
out a common ground with white non-Jews by casting the Jews as 
the common enemy? And does it matter, if the dangers of anti-
Semitism prove greater than those of undifferentiated anti-white 
hatred? 
The what or message uttered in the context of hate speech 
also matters, and may or may not, depending on its form and 
content, call for sanction or suppression. Obvious hate speech 
such as that involving crude racist insults or invectives can be 
characterized as "hate speech in form." In contrast, utterances 
such as Holocaust denials or other coded messages that do not 
explicitly convey insults, but are nonetheless designed to convey 
hatred or contempt, may be referred as "hate speech in 
substance." At first glance, it may seem easy to justify banning 
hate speech in form but not hate speech in substance. Indeed, in 
the context of the latter, there appear to be potentially daunting 
line-drawing problems, as the boundary between genuine 
scholarly, scientific or political debate and the veiled promotion of 
racial hatred may not always be easy to draw. Moreover, even 
" For example, Neo-Nazis in the United States are so marginalized and discredited 
that virtually no one believes that they pose any realistic danger. In contrast, a statement 
(that is better qualified as anti-Semitic rather than as an instance of hate speech) to the 
effect that the Jews have too much influence in the United States because they control the 
media—which is in part true—and the banks—which is patently false—uttered by the 
country's highest military official a few years back caused quite an uproar and led to his 
resignation. See Editorial, Counting the Jews, NATION, Oct. 3,1988, at 257. 
Because of prevailing social and economic circumstances, it has often been the case 
that the whites with whom black ghetto dwellers have the most—often unpleasant— 
contacts, namely shopkeepers and landlords, happen to be Jews. See Vince Beiser, 
Surviving The Rage in Harlem, JERUSALEM REP., Feb. 8,1996, at 30. 
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hate speech in form may not be used in a demeaning way 
warranting suppression.^^ 
Finally, where and under what circumstances hate speech is 
uttered also makes a difference in terms of whether or not it 
should be prohibited. As already mentioned, "where" may make a 
difference depending on the country, society or culture involved, 
which may justify flatly prohibiting all Nazi propaganda in 
Germany but not in the United States. "Where" may also matter 
within the same country or society. Thus, hate speech in an intra-
communal setting may in some cases be less dangerous than if 
uttered in an inter-communal setting. Without minimizing the 
dangers of hate speech, it seems plausible to argue, for example, 
that hate speech directed against Germans at a Jewish community 
center comprising many Holocaust survivors, or a virulent anti-
white speech at an all black social club in the United States, should 
not be subjected to the same sanctions as the very same utterance 
in an inter-communal setting, such as an open political rally in a 
town's central square.'® 
Circumstances also make a difference. For example, even if 
black hate speech against whites in the United States is deemed as 
pernicious as white hate speech against blacks, legal consequences 
arguably ought to differ depending on the circumstances. Thus, 
for example, black hate speech ought not be penalized—or at least 
not as much as otherwise—^if it occurs in the course of a 
spontaneous reaction to a police shooting of an innocent black 
victim in a locality with widespread perceptions of racial bias 
within the police department. 
More generally, which of the above mentioned differences 
ought to figure in the constitutional treatment of hate speech 
depends on the values sought to be promoted, on the perceived 
harms involved, and on the importance attributed to these harms. 
As already noted, the United States' approach to these issues 
differs markedly from those of other Western democracies. 
Before embarking on a comparison of these contrasting 
approaches however, it is necessary to specify two important 
points concerning the scope of the present inquiry: 1) there will be 
For example, in the United States the word "nigger" is an insulting and demeaning 
word that is used to refer to a person who is black, '^en uttered by a white person to 
refer to a black person, it undoubtedly fits the label "hate speech in form." However, as 
used among blacks, it often serves as an endearing term connoting at once intra-communal 
solidarity and implicit condemnation of white racism. 
What accoimts for their difference is that the oppressed are in a different position 
than the oppressors. Reaction by the oppressed even if tinged with hatred should 
therefore arguably be somewhat more tolerated then hate messages by members of 
traditionally oppressor groups. 
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no discussion of the advantages or disadvantages of various 
approaches to the regulation of hate speech, such as imposition of 
criminal versus civil hability; and 2) since all the countries which 
will be discussed below including the United States deny 
protection to hate speech that incites violence—or, to put it in 
terms of the relevant American jurisprudence, that poses "a clear 
and present danger"" of violence—^what follows will not focus on 
such speech. Instead, it will be on hate speech that incites racial 
hatred or hostility but that falls short of incitement to violence. 
This last limitation is important for two reasons. First, prohibiting 
hate speech that constitutes a clear incitement to immediate 
violence hardly seems a difficult decision. Second, criticism of the 
United States for tolerating hate speech does not always seem to 
take into account the difference between incitement to violence 
and incitement to discrimination or hatred. But, unless this 
difference is kept in mind, the discussion is likely to become 
confusing. Indeed, the key question is not whether speech hkely to 
lead to immediate violence ought to be protected, but rather 
whether hate speech not likely to lead to such immediate violence, 
but capable of producing more subtle and uncertain evils, albeit 
perhaps equally pernicious, ought to be suppressed or fought with 
more speech. 
II. HATE SPEECH AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF FREE SPEECH 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Freedom of speech is not only the most cherished American 
constitutional right, but also one of America's foremost cultural 
symbols.'® Moreover, the prominence of free speech in the United 
States is due to many different factors, including a strong 
preference for liberty over equality, commitment to individualism, 
and a natural rights tradition derived from Locke which champions 
freedom from the state—or negative freedom—over freedom 
through the state—or positive freedom." In essence, free speech 
rights in the United States are conceived as belonging to the 
individual against the state, and they are enshrined in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution as a prohibition against 
government interference, rather than as the imposition of a 
" See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 7 (1986). 
1' For a thorough diseussion of the distinction between positive and negative liberty, 
see ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969). 
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positive duty on government to guarantee the receipt and 
transmission of ideas among its citizens.^" 
Even beyond hate speech, freedom of speech is a much more 
pervasive constitutional right in the United States than in most 
other constitutional democracies." Indeed, Americans have a 
deep seated belief in free speech as a virtually unlimited good and 
a strong fear that an active government in the area of speech will 
much more likely result in harm than in good. In spite of this, 
however, there have been significant discrepancies between theory 
and practice throughout the twentieth century, with the 
consequence that American protection of speech has been less 
extensive than official rhetoric or popular belief would lead one to 
believe. For example, although political speech has been widely 
recognized as the most worthy of protection,^^ for much of the 
twentieth century, laws aimed at suppressing or criminalizing 
socialist and communist views were routinely upheld as 
constitutional.^^ With respect to communist views, therefore, 
American protection of political speech has been more limited 
than that afforded by most other Western democracies. 
American theory and practice relating to free speech is 
ultimately complex and not always consistent. Accordingly, to 
better understand the American approach to hate speech—^which 
has itself changed over time^"—^it must be briefly placed in its 
proper historical and theoretical context. 
In the broadest terms, one can distinguish four different 
historical stages in which the perceived principal function of free 
speech saw significant changes. On the other hand, there have also 
been four principal philosophical justifications of free speech, 
which have informed or explained the relevant constitutional 
jurisprudence. Moreover, the philosophical justifications do not 
necessarily correspond to the historical stages, but rather 
intertwine and overlap with them. Nor do sharp boundaries 
separate the four historical stages which run into each other and in 
20 The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no 
law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press —" U.S. CONST, amend. I. 
21 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (involving a flag burning at the 1984 
Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46 (1988) (concerning a crude parody of a church leader); New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (involving the publication of classified diplomatic 
irrformation susceptible of adversely affecting sensitive peace negotiations). In each case, 
the Supreme Court held that the expression involved was constitutionally protected. 
22 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948). 
22 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
2* See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text. 
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which free speech fulfills various different functions. The principal 
marking point between these various stages is a shift in the 
dominant function of free speech. All this makes for a complex 
construct with a large number of possible permutations. 
Accordingly, only the broadest outlines of the historical and 
theoretical context of American free speech jurisprudence will be 
considered in what follows. 
Of the four historical stages of free speech, the first three have 
had definite—^if often only implicit—^influences on the Supreme 
Court's free speech jurisprudence. In contrast, the fourth stage, 
which is still in its infancy, thus far has had virtually no effect on 
the judicial approach to free speech issues, though it has already 
made a clear imprint on certain legislators and scholars.^^ The first 
of these historical stages dates back to the 1776 War of 
Independence against Britain, and establishes protection of the 
people against the government as the principal purpose of free 
speech.^® Once democracy had become firmly entrenched in the 
United States, however, the principal threat to free speech came 
not from the government but from the "tyranny of the majority." 
Accordingly, in stage two, free speech was meant above all to 
protect proponents of unpopular views against the wrath of the 
majority.^^ Stage three, which roughly covers the period between 
the mid-1950s to the 1980s, corresponds to a period in the United 
States in which many believed that there had been an end to 
ideology,^^ resulting in a widespread consensus on essential 
values.^' Stage three is thus marked by pervasive conformity, and 
the principal function of free speech shifts from lifting restraints on 
speakers to insuring that listeners remain open-minded.^° Finally, 
beginning in the 1980s with the rapid expansion of feminist theory, 
critical race theory and other alternative discourses—aU of which 
attacked mainstream and official speech as inherently oppressive, 
white male dominated discourse—^there emerged a strong belief in 
the pluralization and fragmentation of discourse. Consistent with 
that belief, the principal role of free speech in stage four becomes 
the protection of oppressed and marginalized discourses and their 
25 An example of legislation consistent with stage four is the ordinance held 
unconstitutional in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). For an example of 
scholarship informed by a stage four perspective, see MARY J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS 
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1993); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED; 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). 
2® See BOLLINGER, supra note 18, at 144. 
22 Id. 
2« See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1965). 
2® See BOLLINGER, supra note 18, at 143-44. 
30 Id. 
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proponents against the hegemonic tendencies of the discourses of 
the powerful.^^ 
Of these four stages, stage three affords the greatest 
justification for toleration of hate speech,while stage four 
provides the strongest case for its suppression—at least to the 
extent that it targets racial or religious minorities. Stages one and 
two do not provide clear cut answers as the perceived evils of hate 
speech are likely to fluctuate depending on the circumstances. 
Assuming in stage one that hate speech is not promoted by 
government, the magnitude of the harms associated with it would 
depend on the degree of sympathy or revulsion which it produces 
in official circles. In stage two, on the other hand, even if those 
who engage in hate speech constitute but a very small minority of 
the population, the danger posed by hate speech would depend on 
whether political majorities tend to agree with that speech's 
underlying message, or whether they are seriously disturbed by it 
and firmly committed to combating the views it seeks to convey. 
Assessment of how hate speech might fare under the four 
different historical stages is made much more difficult if the four 
main philosophical justifications for free speech in the United 
States are taken into proper account. These four justifications can 
be referred to respectively as: the justification from democracy; the 
justification from social contract; the justification from the pursuit 
of the truth; and the justification from individual autonomy.^^ As 
we shall see, each of these justifications ascribes a different scope 
of legitimacy to free speech. Moreover, even different versions of 
the same justification lead to shifts in the boundaries between 
speech that requires protection and speech that may be 
constitutionally restricted, and such shifts are particularly 
important in the context of hate speech. 
The justification from democracy is premised on the 
conviction that freedom of speech serves an indispensable function 
in the process of democratic self-government.^" Without the 
freedom to convey and receive ideas, citizens cannot successfully 
carry out the task of democratic self-government. Accordingly, 
political speech needs to be protected, but not necessary all 
See, e.g., MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 25; MACKINNON, supra note 25. 
32 For an extended argument in favor of such toleration from a stage three perspective, 
see BOLLINGER, supra note 18. 
33 For an extensive discussion of philosophical justifications of free speech that both 
overlaps with, and differs from, the present discussion, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE 
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). 
3^ The principal exponent of this view was Alexander Meiklejohn. See MEIKLEJOHN, 
supra note 22. 
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political speech.^^ If the paramount objective is the preservation 
and promotion of democracy, then anti-democratic speech in 
general, and hate and political extremist speech in particular, 
would in all hkelihood serve no useful purpose, and would 
therefore not warrant protection.^® 
The justification from social contract theory is in many ways 
similar to that from democracy, but the two do not necessarily call 
for protection of the same speech. Unlike the other three 
justifications, that from social contract theory is at bottom 
procedural in nature. Under this justification, fundamental 
political institutions must be justifiable in terms of an actual or 
hypothetical agreement among all members of the relevant 
societyand significant changes in those institutions must be 
made only through such agreements. Just as with justification 
from democracy, in justification from social contract there is a 
need for free exchange and discussion of ideas. Unlike the 
justification from democracy, however, social contract cannot 
exclude ex ante any views which, though incompatible with 
democracy, might be relevant to a social contractor's decision to 
embrace the pohty's fundamental institutions or to agree to any 
particular form of pohtical organization. Accordingly, the 
justification from social contract seems to require some tolerance 
of hate speech, if not in form then at least in substance. 
The justification from the pursuit of the truth originates in the 
utilitarian philosophy of John Stuart Mill. According to Mill, the 
discovery of truth is an incremental empirical process that relies on 
trial and error and that requires uninhibited discussion.^® Mill's 
justification for very broad freedom of expression was imported 
into American constitutional jurisprudence by Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, and became known as the justification based on 
the free marketplace of ideas.®' This justification, which has been 
dominant in the United States ever since,'" is premised on the firm 
35 Meiklejohn himself had a broad view of political speech, and advocated an extensive 
protection of it. 
3® It is of course possible to maintain that toleration of extremist anti-democratic 
speech would tend to invigorate the proponents of democracy and hence ultimately 
strengthen rather than weaken democracy. Be that as it may, toleration of anti­
democratic views is not logically required for purposes of advancing self-governing 
democracy. For example, advocacy of violent overthrow of democratically elected 
government and establishment of a dictatorship need not be protected to ensure vigorous 
debate on ail plausible alternatives consistent with democracy. 
^ See, E.G., JOHN RAWLS,ATHEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12(1971). 
3« See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 1 (John Gray ed., 1991). 
3' See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
See SCHAUER, supra note 33, at 15-16. 
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belief that truth is more likely to prevail through open discussion 
(even if such discussion temporarily unwittingly promotes 
falsehoods) than through any other means bent on eradicating 
falsehoods outright. 
Mill's strong endorsement of free speech was rooted in his 
optimistic belief in social progress. According to his view, truth 
would always ultimately best falsehood so long as discussion 
remained possible, and hence even potentially harmful speech 
should be tolerated as its potential evils could best be minimized 
through open debate. Accordingly, Mill advocated protection of 
all speech so long as it falls short of incitement to violence. 
Although Holmes's justification of free expression is very 
similar to Mill's, his reasons for embracing the free marketplace of 
ideas differ. Unlike Mill, Holmes was driven by skepticism and 
pessimism and expressed grave doubts about the possibility of 
truth. Because of this, Holmes justified his free marketplace 
approach on pragmatic grounds. Since most strongly held views 
eventually prove false, any limitation on speech is most likely 
grounded on false ideas. Accordingly, Holmes was convinced that 
a free marketplace of ideas was likely to reduce harm in two 
distinct ways: it would lower the possibility that expression would 
be needlessly suppressed based on falsehoods; and it would 
encourage most people who tend stubbornly to hold on to harmful 
or worthless ideas to develop a healthy measure of self-doubt."' 
Like Mill, Holmes did not endorse unlimited freedom of 
speech. For Holmes, speech should be protected unless it poses a 
"clear and present danger" to people, such as falsely shouting 
"fire" in a crowded theater and thereby causing panic."^ Both 
Mill's and Holmes's justification from the pursuit of truth justify 
protection of hate speech that does not amount to incitement to 
violence. Indeed speech amounting to an "incitement to violence" 
is but one instance of speech that poses a "clear and present 
danger." In the end, whether speech incites to violence or creates 
another type of clear and present danger, it does not deserve 
protection—^under the justification from the pursuit of truth— 
because it is much more likely to lead to harrrful action than to 
more speech, and hence it undermines the functioning of the 
marketplace of ideas. 
In the end. Mill and Holmes represent two sides of the same 
coin. Mill overestimates the potential of rational discussion while 
Holmes underestimates the potential for serious harm of certain 
types of speech that fall short of the clear and present danger test. 
« See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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The justification from the pursuit of truth is at bottom pragmatic. 
As we shall see below, however, because both the Millian and 
Holmesian pragmatic reasons for the toleration of hate speech are 
based on dubious factual claims, they may in the end undermine 
rather than bolster any pragmatic justification of tolerance of hate 
speech that falls short of incitement to violence."^ 
Unlike the three preceding justifications, which are collective 
in nature, the fourth justification for free speech, that from 
autonomy, is primarily individual-regarding. Indeed, democracy, 
social peace and harmony through the social contract, and pursuit 
of the truth, are collective goods designed to benefit society as a 
whole. In contrast, individual autonomy and well-being through 
self-expression are presumably always of benefit to the individual 
concerned, without in many cases necessarily producing any 
further societal good. 
The justification from autonomy is based on the conviction 
that individual autonomy and respect require protection of 
virtually unconstrained self-expression."^ Accordingly, all kinds of 
utterances arguably linked to an individual's felt need for self-
expression ought to be afforded constitutional protection. And 
consistent with this, the justification from autonomy clearly affords 
the broadest scope of protection for all types of speech. 
As originally conceived, the justification from autonomy 
seemed exclusively concerned with the self-expression needs of 
speakers. Since hate speech could plausibly contribute to the 
fulfillment of the self-expression needs of its proponents, it would 
definitely seem to qualify for protection under the justification 
from autonomy. 
Under a less individualistic—or at least less atomistic— 
conception of autonomy and self-respect, however, focusing 
exclusively on the standpoint of the speaker would seem 
insufficient. Indeed, if autonomy and self-respect are considered 
from the standpoint of listeners, then hate speech may well loom 
as prone to undermining the autonomy and self-respect of those 
whom it targets. This last observation becomes that much more 
urgent under a stage four conception of the nature and scope of 
legitimate regulation of speech. Indeed, if the main threat of 
unconstrained speech is the hegemony of dominant discourses at 
For an extended critique of the use of pragmatism to justify free speech protection 
of hate speech that does not pose a clear and present danger of violence, see MICHEL 
ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS; LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS 150-96 
(1998). 
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); David A. J. Richards, 
Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward A Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 45 (1975). 
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the expense of the discourses of oppressed minorities, then self-
expression of the powerful threatens the autonomy of those whose 
voices are being downed, and hate speech against the latter can 
only exacerbate their humiliation and the denial of their 
autonomy. 
As these last observations indicate, the possible intersections 
between the four historical stages and the four philosophical 
justifications are multiple and complex. Current American 
constitutional jurisprudence concerning hate speech, however, 
relies by and large on the justification from the pursuit of truth and 
tends to espouse implicitly a stage three—or a combination of 
stage two and stage three—^vision on the proper role of speech. 
Judicial treatment of hate speech in the United States is of 
relatively recent vintage. Indeed, approximately fifty years ago, in 
Beauhamais v. Illinois,*^ the Supreme Court upheld a conviction 
for hate speech emphasizing that such speech amounted to group 
defamation, and reasoning that such defamation was in all relevant 
respects analogous to individual defamation, which had 
traditionally been excluded from free speech protection. 
Beauhamais, a white supremacist, had distributed a leaflet 
accusing blacks, among other things, of rape, robbery and other 
violent crimes. Although Beauhamais had urged whites to unite 
and protect themselves against the evUs he attributed to blacks, he 
had not been found to have posed a "clear and present danger" of 
violence. 
Beauhamais has never been exphcitly repudiated, but it has 
been thoroughly undermined by subsequent decisions. Already, 
the dissenting opinions in Beauhamais attacked the Court's 
majority rationale, by stressing that both the libel and the "fighting 
words.""® exceptions to free speech involved utterances addressed 
to individuals, and were hence unlikely to have any significant 
impact on public debate. In contrast, group hbel was a pubhc, not 
private, matter and its prohibition would inhibit pubhc debate. 
The current constitutional standard, which draws the line at 
incitement to violence, was established in the 1969 Brandenburg v. 
Ohio*^ decision. Brandenburg involved a leader and several 
members of the Ku Klux Klan who in a rally staged for television 
(in front of only a few reporters) made several derogatory remarks 
mainly against blacks, but also some against Jews. In addition. 
-*5 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), the Supreme Court held 
that insults addressed to an individual that were so offensive as to readily prompt a violent 
reaction did not fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. 
395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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while not threatening any imminent or direct violence, the 
speakers suggested that blacks should return to Africa and Jews to 
Israel, and announced that they would petition the government to 
act, but that if it refused they would have no other recourse than to 
take matters in their own hands. Selected portions of this rally 
were later broadcast on local and national television. 
The Supreme Court in a unanimous decision set aside 
Brandenburg's criminal conviction concluding that the Klan may 
have advocated violence, but that it had not incited it. 
Significantly, in drawing the line between incitement and 
advocacy, the Court apphed to hate speech a standard it had 
recently estabhshed to deal with communist speech involving 
advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government."® In so doing, 
the Court's decision raises the question of whether hate speech 
ought to be equated with (politically) extremist speech. While the 
intricacies of this issue remain beyond the scope of this Article, 
two brief observations seem in order. First, extremist speech 
based on a political ideology like communism is above all pohtical 
speech and does not necessarily involve personal hatred. Second, 
even if extremist speech involved such hatred—e.g., if communists 
seek to fuel passions against those whom they call "capitalist 
pigs"—such hatred cannot be simply equated with virulent anti-
Semitism or racism. 
If one case has come to symbolize the contemporary pohtical 
and constitutional response to hate speech in the United States, it 
is the Skokie case in the late 1970s. This case arose out of a 
proposed march by Neo-Nazis in fuU SS uniform with swastikas 
through Skokie, a suburb of Chicago with a large Jewish 
population, including thousands of Holocaust survivors. The local 
municipal authorities took measures—^including enacting new 
legislation—designed to prevent the march, but both state and 
federal courts eventuaUy invalidated the measures as violative of 
the Neo-Nazis' free speech rights."' 
The Neo-Nazis made it clear that their choice of Skokie for 
the march was intended to upset Jews, by confronting them with 
their message. The constitutional battle focused on whether the 
proposed march in Skokie would amount to an "incitement to 
violence." Based on the testimony of Holocaust survivors residing 
in Skokie, who asserted that exposure to the swastika might 
provoke them to violence, a lower state court determined that such 
^ See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (holding conviction for mere 
advocacy imconstitutional). 
See Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); Nat'l Sociahst Party of Am. v. Vill. of 
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); 
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a march could be prohibited.^" 
That decision was reversed on appeal, on the ground that the 
lower court had wrongly concluded that the proposed march had 
met the "incitement to violence" requirement.^' While 
acknowledging the intensity of the likely feelings of Holocaust 
survivors, the court held that they were not sufficient to prohibit 
the proposed march." The court did not specify what standard 
would have to be met to justify banning display of the swastika. 
What if a Jew who is not a Holocaust survivor had testified that a 
Neo-Nazi march with a Swastika would move him to violence? Or 
else, what if a gentile had thus testified? 
These uncertainties illustrate some of the difficulties 
associated with the "incitement to violence" standard, even if one 
assumes that it is the right standard. Be that as it may, the Skokie 
controversy ultimately fizzled, for after their legal victories, the 
Neo-Nazis decided not to march in Skokie. Instead, they marched 
in Chicago far from any Jewish neighborhood." Because of their 
very marginality, and because they had no sway over the larger 
non-target audience in the United States, the actual march by the 
Neo-Nazis did much more to showcase their isolation and 
impotence than to advance their cause. Under those 
circumstances, allowing them to express their hate message 
probably contributed more to discrediting them than a judicial 
prohibition against their march. 
Because of contextual factors prevalent in the United States 
during the late 1970s, the result in the Skokie case may appear to 
be pragmatically justified, and to fit within a stage three 
conception of free speech.'" Indeed, in as much as the Neo-Nazi 
message had no appeal, and reminded its listeners of past horrors 
as well as of the fact that the United States had to go to war 
against Hitler's Germany, it could conceivably be analogized to a 
vaccine against total complacency. Moreover, by the very 
falsehood of its ring, utterance of the Neo-Nazi message could well 
be interpreted as reinforcing the belief in a need for virtually 
unlimited free speech associated with the justification from the 
pursuit of the truth." 
50 Vill. of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d. 21 (111. 1978). 
51 Mat 24. 
52 See id. 
55 See Smith, 439 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
5'' For an extended argument in support of the judicial handling of the Skokie case 
within the scope of a stage three conception, see BOLLINGER, supra note 18. 
55 It is significtmt, consistent with these observations, that Jews were on both sides of 
the Skokie controversy, as civil rights organizations defended the Neo-Nazis' right to 
speak. For a further analysis of this fact, see Michel Rosenfeld, Extremist Speech and the 
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Even if the Skokie case was rightly decided, the constitutional 
jurisprudence which it helped to shape has proved quite troubling 
when applied under less favorable circumstances. ITiis conclusion 
becomes manifest from a consideration of the case of R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paulf^ involving the burning of a cross inside the fenced 
yard of a black family by young white extremists." The latter were 
convicted under a local criminal ordinance which provided in 
relevant part that: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, 
object,... but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, 
which one knows... arouses anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender 
commits disorderly conduct 
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction, holding the above ordinance imconstitutional for 
two principal reasons: First, it targeted speech that would not 
amount to an incitement to violence; and second, even granting 
that a burning cross qualified as "fighting words," thus meeting the 
incitement standard, by criminalizing some incitements but not 
others, the ordinance was based on impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination. Indeed, while the ordinance criminalized 
expression likely to incite violence on the basis of race or religion, 
it did not criminalize similar expression equally hkely to incite 
violence on other bases, such as homosexuality. 
Because of the pervasive nature of racism and the long history 
of oppression and violence against blacks in the United States, and 
given the frightening associations evoked by burning crosses, the 
situation in R.A.V. cannot be equated with that involved in the 
Skokie case. Of course, swastikas tend to inspire as much fear and 
anger in Jews as burning crosses do in blacks. The major difference 
between the Skokie case and R.A.V., however, has to do not with 
the pemiciousness of the respective symbols involved, but with the 
different factual and emotional impact of these symbols on the 
target and non-target audiences before whom they were meant to 
be displayed. 
Significantly, the Holocaust survivors who testified that the 
proposed Neo-Nazi march in Skokie would lead them to violence 
emphasized that their reaction would be triggered by memories of 
the past. Moreover, though there was some anti-Semitism in the 
Paradox of Tolerance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1457,1487 (1987) (book review). 
56 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
The burning of a cross, long a practice of white supremacists, such as those 
belonging to the Ku Klux Klan, has been a symbol of virulent racism much like the display 
of the swastika has been associated with virulent anti-Semitism. 
5® St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime OrdinEuice (1990), quoted in R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380. 
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United States in the 1970s, the small fringe Neo-Nazis were so 
discredited that it seemed most unlikely that they would in any 
way, directly or indirectly, advance the cause of anti-Semitism.^' In 
contrast, cross burning produced fears not only concerning the 
past but also the present and the future, and not based on events 
that had taken place across an ocean, but on events that had 
marked the sad history of race relations in the United States from 
the founding of the repubhc. Indeed, the cross burning in R.A. V. 
occurred in a racially mixed neighborhood, in an era in which 
several homes of black persons who had moved into white 
neighborhoods had been burned, in efforts to dissuade members of 
a growing black middle class from moving into white 
neighborhoods.®' 
In smn, though both the proposed march in Skokie and the 
cross burning in R.A.V. were meant to incite hatred on the basis of 
religion and race respectively, their effects were quite different. 
Skokie mainly produced contempt for the marchers and a 
reminder that there was little danger of an embrace of Nazism in 
the United States. R.A.V., on the other hand, played on pervasive, 
and to a significant degree justified, fears concerning race relations 
in America. Undoubtedly, cross burning itself is rejected as 
repugnant by the vast majority of Americans. The imderlying 
racism associated with it, and the message that blacks should 
remain in their own segregated neighborhoods, however, 
unfortunately still have adherents among a non-neghgible portion 
of whites in America. 
The ultimate difference between the impact of the hate 
speech in Skokie and that in R.A.V. relates to the emotional 
reactions of the respective target and non-target audiences 
involved. In Skokie, the vast majority of Jews felt no genuine 
present or future threat whereas the non-target gentile audience 
felt mainly contempt and hostility towards the Nazi hate message. 
In R.A.V., however, the target audience definitely experienced 
anger, fear and concern while the non-target audience was split 
along a spectrum spanning from revulsion to mixed emotions to 
5' This last observation may no longer hold true in view of certain more recent events, 
which have increased the profile of white supremacist extremists. For example, in a recent 
incident, several children were shot at a Jewish day-care center in Lxts Angeles. See Terry 
McDermott, Panic Pierces Illusion of Safety, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1999, at Al. In 
Chicago, a white supremacist went on a shooting spree which included the firing of many 
shots that did not cause any injuries near a synagogue. See Suspect In Racial Shootings 
Had a Troubled Past, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 16,1999, at A8. During that same 
spree, however, that individual killed both a Black and Asian person. See id. 
^ See, e.g.. Second Racial Attack in Two Weeks, UPl, Nov. 20, 1984, Tuesday, AM 
Cycle; [untitled], UPI, Feb. 18,1997, LEXIS, Nexis, Library, UPI FUe. 
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downright sympathy for the substance of the hate message if not 
for its form." 
III. THE TREATMENT OF HATE SPEECH UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF OTHER WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 
If free speech in the United States is shaped above all by 
individualism and libertarianism, collective concerns and other 
values such as honor and dignity he at the heart of the conceptions 
of free speech that originate in international covenants or in the 
constitutional jurisprudence of other Western democracies. Thus, 
for example, Canadian constitutional jurisprudence is more 
concerned with multiculturalism and group-regarding equahty." 
For its part, the German Constitution sets the inviolabihty of 
human dignity as its paramount value,^^ and specifically limits 
freedom of expression to the extent necessary to protect the young 
and the right to personal honor.®^ 
These differences have had a profound impact on the 
treatment of hate speech. In order to better appreciate this, I shall 
briefly focus on salient developments in three countries and under 
certain international covenants. The three countries in question 
are Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany. 
As this article was going to press, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Virginia v. Black, 
123 S. Q. 1536, 538 U.S. (2003), in which it held that criminalizing cross burning with 
an intent to intimidate was constitutional, but that the Virginia statute before it was 
unconstitutional because it treated cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to 
intimidate. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor noted that throughout the history of 
the Ku Klux Klan, "cross burnings have been used to communicate both threats of 
violence and messages of shared ideology." Id. at 1545. Because cross burnings have 
frequently been followed by beatings, lynchings, shootings and killings of African-
Americans, they either amount to incitements to violence or they create a reasonable fear 
in those whom they target of becoming victims of impending violence. On the other hand, 
when cross burnings are carried out at meetings exclusively attended by members of Klan, 
the most likely intent is communication of group solidarity among fellow believers in the 
ideology of white supremacy. Accordingly, the Court's decision in Black is consistent with 
R.A V and with the "incitement to violence" standard applied in hate speech cases. 
® See Kathleen Mahoney, The Canadian Constitutional Approach to Freedom of 
Expression in Hate Propaganda and Pornography, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 
(1992). 
® See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 1 (F.R.G.), translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF 
THE BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW 227 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 
1988). 
See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(2) (F.R.G.), translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF 
THE BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW 228 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 
1988). 
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A. Canada 
It is particularly interesting to start with the contrast between 
the United States and Canada, two neighboring countries which 
were once British colonies and which are now advanced 
industrialized democracies with large immigrant populations with 
roots in a vast array of countries and cultures. Moreover, while 
Canada has produced a constitutional jurisprudence that is clearly 
distinct from that of the United States, the Canadian Supreme 
Court has displayed great familiarity with American 
jurisprudence.®' 
Although both the United States and Canada are multiethnic 
and multicultural polities, the United States has embraced an 
assimilationalist ideal symbolized by the metaphor of the "melting 
pot" while Canada has placed greater emphasis on cultural 
diversity and has promoted the ideal of an "ethnic mosaic."®® 
Consistent with this difference, the Canadian Supreme Court has 
explicitly refused to follow the American approach to hate speech. 
In a closely divided decision, the Canadian Court upheld the 
criminal conviction of a high school teacher who had 
communicated anti-Semitic propaganda to his pupils in the leading 
case of Regina v. Keegstra.^^ 
Keegstra told his pupils that Jews were "treacherous," 
"subversive," "sadistic," "money loving," "power hungry" and 
"child killers." He went on to say that the Jews "created the 
Holocaust to gain sympathy." He concluded that Jews were 
inherently evil and expected his students to reproduce his 
teachings on their exams in order to avoid bad grades.®® 
The criminal statute under which Keegstra had been 
convicted prohibited the willful promotion of hatred against a 
group identifiable on the basis of color, race, religion or ethnic 
origin.®^ The statute in question made no reference to incitement 
to violence, nor was there any evidence that Keegstra had any 
intent to lead his pupils to violence. 
In examining the constitutionality of Keegstra's conviction, 
the Canadian Supreme Court referred to the following concerns as 
^ One example is the thorough discussion of American decisions and rejection of the 
American approach in the majority opinion in Canada's leading hate speech case, Regina 
V. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
®® See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL QTIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
MINORITY RIGHTS 14 (1995). 
67 Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 687. 
68 See id. at 714. 
69 See id. at 713. 
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providing support for freedom of expression under the Canadian 
Charter: 
(1) seeking and attaining truth is an inherently good activity; (2) 
participation in social and political decision-making is to be 
fostered and encouraged; and (3) diversity in forms of 
individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be 
cultivated in a tolerant and welcoming environment for the sake 
of both those who convey a meaning and those to whom 
meaning is conveyed.™ 
Thus, the Canadian protection of freedom of expression, like the 
American, relies on the justifications from democracy, from the 
pursuit of truth and from autonomy. The Canadian conception of 
autonomy, however, is less individualistic than its American 
counterpart, as it seemingly places equal emphasis on the 
autonomy of listeners and speakers. 
In spite of these affinities, the Canadian Supreme Court 
refused to follow the American lead and draw the line at 
incitement to violence. Stressing the Canadian Constitution's 
commitment to multicultural diversity, group identity, human 
dignity and equahty," the Court adopted a nuanced approach 
designed to harmonize these values with those embedded in 
freedom of expression. And based on this approach, the Court 
concluded that hate propaganda such as that promoted by 
Keegstra did not warrant protection as it did more to undermine 
mutual respect among diverse racial, religious and cultural groups 
in Canada than to promote any genuine expression needs or 
values. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Canadian Court considered the 
likely impact of hate propaganda on both the target-group and on 
non-target group audiences. Members of the target group are 
likely to be degraded and humiliated, to experience injuries to 
their sense of self-worth and acceptance in the larger society, and 
may as a consequence avoid contact with members of other groups 
within the polity.™ Those who are not members of the target 
group, or society at large, on the other hand, may become 
gradually de-sensitized and may in the long run become accepting 
of messages of racial or religious inferiority." 
Not only does the Canadian approach to hate speech focus on 
gradual long-term effects likely to pose serious threats to social 
cohesion rather than merely on immediate threats to violence, but 
™ Id. at 728. 
See id. at 736. 
See id. at 746. 
See id. at 747. 
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it also departs from its American counterpart in its assessment of 
the likely effects of speech. Contrary to the American assumption 
that truth will ultimately prevail, or that speech alone may not lead 
to truth but is unlikely to produce serious harm, the Canadian 
Supreme Court is mindful that hate propaganda can lead to great 
harm by bypassing reason and playing on the emotions. In support 
of this, the Court cited approvingly the following observations 
contained in a study conducted by a committee of the Canadian 
Parliament: 
The successes of modern advertising, the triumphs of impudent 
propaganda such as Hitler's, have qualified sharply our belief in 
the rationality of man. We know that under strain and pressure 
in times of irritation and frustration, the individual is swayed 
and even swept away by hysterical, emotional appeals. We act 
irresponsibly if we ignore the way in which emotion can drive 
reason from the field.^" 
In short, the Canadian treatment of hate speech differs from 
its American counterpart in two principal respects: First, it is 
grounded on somewhat different normative priorities; and second, 
the two countries differ in their practical assessments of the 
consequences of tolerating hate speech. Under the American 
view, there seems to be a greater likelihood of harm from 
suppression of hate speech that falls short of incitement to 
violence than from its toleration. From a Canadian perspective, 
on the other hand, dissemination of hate propaganda seems more 
dangerous than its suppression as it is seen as likely to produce 
enduring injuries to self-worth and to undermine social cohesion in 
the long run. 
B. The United Kingdom 
Unlike the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom 
does not have a written constitution. Nevertheless, it recognizes a 
right to freedom of expression through its adherence to 
international covenants, such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and through commitment to constitutional values 
inherent in its rule of law tradition.'^ Moreover, the United 
7" Id. 
75 See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR], 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex 
parte Brind, 1 A.C. 696 (1991) (holding that freedom of expression is considered a basic 
right under both written and unwritten constitutions). Furthermore, through adoption of 
the Human Rights Act of 1998, which became effective in October 2000, the United 
Kingdom has incorporated ECHR Article 10 into domestic law, thus making it directly 
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Kingdom has criminalized hate speech going back as far as the 
seventeenth century. The focus of British regulation of free 
speech has shifted over the years, starting with concern with 
reinforcing the security of the government, continuing with 
preoccupation with incitement to racial hatred among non-target 
audiences, and culminating with the aim of protecting targets 
against racially motivated harassment. As we shall see, the results 
of British regulation have been mixed, with significant success 
against Fascists and Nazis, but with much less success in attempts 
to defuse racial animosity between whites and non-whites. 
The seventeenth century offense of seditious hbel punished 
the utterance or publication of statements with "an intention to 
bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against the 
person of Her Majesty... or to promote feelings of ill-will and 
hostility between different classes of ... [her] subjects."^® To the 
extent that seditious hbel allows for punishment of pohtical 
criticism of the government, it contravenes a core function of 
modem freedom of expression rights. Although seditious libel was 
primarily used to punish those perceived to pose a threat to the 
monarchy, occasionally, it was used in the context of what today is 
called "hate speech."" Thus, in Regina v. Osborne'^ the publishers 
of a pamphlet that asserted that certain Jews had killed a woman 
and her child because the latter's father was a Christian were 
convicted of seditious libel. As a consequence of distribution of 
the pamphlet some Jews were beaten and threatened with death." 
As this case involved direct incitement to violence and a clear 
threat to the maintenance of public order, it may be best viewed as 
vindicating govemment dominance and control rather than as 
protecting the Jews from group defamation. 
Because seditious libel can be used to fmstrate criticism of 
govemment, it can pose a threat to the kind of vigorous debate 
that is indispensable in a working democracy. Significantly, as 
used in the early twentieth century, seditious libel became rather 
ineffective as convictions could only be obtained upon proof of 
direct incitement to violence or breach of public order.™ In 1936, 
Parliament adopted Section 5 of the Public Order Act.^^ This 
applicable before British courts. See Thomas Morton, Free Speech v. Racial Aggravation, 
149NEWL.J. 1198(1999). 
ANTHONY LESTER & GEOFFREY BINDMAN, RACE AND LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN 
345 (1972). 
77 Id. 
78 2 Swanst. 503n (1732). 
79 See LESTER & BINDMAN, supra note 76, at 345. 
80 Id. at 347. 
81 Public Order Act, 1936,1 GEO. 6, c. 6, § 5 (Eng.). 
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legislation, which proved useful in combating the rise of British 
Fascism prior to and during World War II, relaxed the seditious 
libel standards in two critical respects: first it allowed for 
punishment of speech "likely" to lead to violence even if it did not 
actually result in violence; and, second it allowed for punishment 
of mere intent to provoke violence.® 
After World War II, the United Kingdom enacted further 
laws against hate propaganda, consistent with its obligations under 
international covenants.® Thus, in 1965, the British Parliament 
enacted Section 6 of the Race Relations Act (RRA 1965) which 
made it a crime to utter in public or to publish words "which are 
threatening, abusive or insulting" and which are intended to incite 
hatred on the basis of race, color or national origin.® 
The RRA 1965 focuses on incitement to hatred rather than on 
incitement to violence, but it reintroduces proof of intent as a 
prerequisite to conviction. This makes prosecution more difficult, 
as evinced by the acquittal in the 1968 Southern News case.® The 
case involved a publication of the Racial Preservation Society, 
which advocated the "return of people of other races from this 
overcrowded island to their own countries." At trial the pubhshers 
asserted that their paper addressed important social issues and that 
it did not attempt to incite hatred. Because of the prosecution's 
failure to establish the requisite intent, the net result of Southern 
News was the dissemination of its racist views in the mainstream 
press, and a judicial determination that its message was a legally 
protected expression of a political position rather than illegal 
promotion of hate speech. 
The problem posed by Southern News was remedied by 
removal of the intent requirement in the Race Relations Act of 
1976 (RRA 1976).® Moreover, the RRA 1965 did lead to a series 
of convictions, but a number of these were obtained against 
leaders of the Black Liberation Movement in the late 1960s, 
raising disturbing questions if not about the law itself, at least 
about its enforcement. For example, in Regina v. Malik,the 
black defendant was convicted and sentenced to a year in prison 
^ See Nathan Courtney, British and U.S. Hate Speech Legislation- A Comparison, 19 
BROOK. J. INT'LL. 727,731 (1993). 
83 Id. at 733. 
8* Race Relations Act, 1965, c. 73, § 6 (1) (Eng.). 
83 This is an unreported case discussed in the London Times. See Race Act not a Curb, 
TIMES (London), Mar. 28,1968, at 2. 
8® See Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 70 (Eng.), quoted in D.J. WALKER & 
MICHAEL J. REDMAN, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE RACE RELATIONS ACT OF 1976, at 215-16 (1977). 
87 R. V. Malik, [1968] 1 All E.R. 582,582 (C.A. 1967). 
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for having asserted that whites are "vicious and nasty people" and 
for stating, inter alia, 
I saw in this country in 1952 white savages kicking black 
women. If you ever see a white man lay hands on a black 
woman, kill him immediately. If you love our brothers and 
sisters you will be willing to die for them.^ 
The defendant admitted that his speech was offensive to 
whites but argued that he had a right to respond to the evils that 
whites had perpetrated against blacks.^' In another case, four 
blacks were convicted of incitement to racial hatred for a speech 
made at Hyde Park's Speakers' Comer in which they called on 
black nurses to give the wrong injection to white people." The 
court was imswayed by the defendants' claim that they were 
expressing their frustrations as blacks who had to endure white 
racism.'^ 
The laws discussed thus far have focused on threats to the 
public and on promotion of hatred through persuasion of non-
target audiences. In 1986, however. Parliament added Section 5 of 
the Public Order Act, which made hate speech punishable if it 
amounted to harassment of a target group or individual, and in 
1997 it enacted the Protection from Harassment Act." These 
provide more tools in the British legal arsenal against hate speech, 
but have not thus far led to any clearer or more definitive 
indication of the ultimate boundaries of punishable hate speech in 
the United Kingdom. In the end, the problem may have to do less 
with the particular legal regime involved, than with the social and 
political context in which that regime is embedded. As already 
mentioned, British legislation has been much more successful in 
combating fascism and Nazism than in dealing with hatred 
between whites and non-whites. Perhaps the reason for that 
difference is that a much greater consensus has prevailed in Britain 
concerning fascism than concerning the absorption and 
accommodation of the large, relatively recent influx of racial 
minorities. 
Bitter Attack on Whites, THE TIMES (London), July 25,1967, at 1. 
® Although the above cited passage urges violence if certain conditions are met, it 
clearly falls short of an "incitement" to violence. Actually, to the extent that it advocates 
violence to combat violence, it arguably preaches self-defense rather than mere 
aggression. 
'O See Sentences Today on Four Coloured Men, TIMES (London), Nov. 29,1967, at 3. 
« Id. 
^ See Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, §§ 5-6 (Eng.); Protection From Harassment Act, 
1997, c. 40, § 7 (Eng.). 
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C. Germany 
The contemporary German approach to hate speech is the 
product of two principal influences: the German Constitution's 
conception of freedom of expression as properly circumscribed by 
fundamental values such as human dignity and by constitutional 
interests such as honor and personality;'^ and the Third Reich's 
historical record against the Jews, especially its virulent hate 
propaganda and discrimination which culminated in the 
Holocaust. 
Unlike the United States, and much like Canada, Germany 
treats freedom of expression as one constitutional right among 
many, rather than as paramount or even as first among equals. 
Whereas under the Canadian Constitution, freedom of expression 
is limited by constitutionally mandated vindications of equality 
and multiculturalism. Under the German Basic Law, freedom of 
expression must be balanced against the pursuit of dignity and 
group-regarding concems.'" 
The contrast between the German approach and other 
approaches to freedom of speech, such as the American or the 
Canadian, is well captured in the following summary assessment of 
the German Constitutional Court's treatment of free speech 
claims: 
First, the value of personal honor always trumps the right to 
utter untrue statements of fact made with knowledge of their 
falsity. If, on the other hand, untrue statements are made about 
a person after an effort was made to check for accuracy, the 
court will balance the conflicting rights and decide accordingly. 
Second, if true statements of fact invade the intimate personal 
sphere of an individual, the right to personal honor trumps 
freedom of speech. But if such truths implicate the social 
sphere, the court once again resorts to balancing. Finally, if the 
expression of an opinion—as opposed to fact—constitutes a 
serious affront to the dignity of a person, the value of personal 
honor triumphs over speech. But if the damage to reputation is 
slight, then again the outcome of the case will depend on careful 
judicial balancing.'^ 
See discussion supra notes 64,65. 
^ The values underlying the Basic Law's approach of freedom of expression were 
discussed by the German Constitutional Court in the landmark Luth case, BverfGE 7,198 
(1958) (stating that the Basic Law "establishes an objective order of values... which 
centers upon dignity of the human personality developing freely within the social 
community...") (translated in DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 363 (2d. ed. 1997)). 
KOMMERS, supra note 94, at 424. 
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In broad terms, freedom of speech, like other constitutional 
rights in Germany, is in part a negative right—^i.e., a right against 
government—and, in part a positive right—^i.e., a right to 
government sponsorship and encouragement of free speech.'® In 
contrast to the Anglo-American approach, which in its Lockean 
tradition regards fundamental rights as inalienable and as 
preceding and transcending civil society, the German tradition 
regards fundamental rights as depending on the (constitutional) 
state for their establishment and support. Consistent with this, the 
more free speech rights are conceived and treated as positive 
rights, the easier it becomes to pin on the state responsibility for 
hate speech which it may find repugnant, but which it does not 
prohibit or punish. Furthermore, the German constitutional 
system is immersed in a normative framework that is more 
Kantian than Lockean, thus requiring a balancing of rights and 
duties not only on the side of the state but also on that of the 
citizenry.'" 
As in the United States, in Germany freedom of speech is 
legitimated from the respective standpoints of the justification 
from democracy, from the pursuit of truth and from autonomy. 
These justifications are conceived quite differently in Germany 
than in the United States, however, with the consequence that the 
nature and scope of free speech rights in Germany stand in sharp 
contrast to their American counterparts. Indeed, because of its 
constitutional commitment to "militant democracy,'"® the German 
justification from democracy does not encompass extremist anti­
democratic speech, including hate speech advocating denial of 
democratic or constitutional rights to its targets. The German 
justification from the pursuit of truth, on the other hand, does not 
embrace its American counterpart's Millean presuppositions. This 
emerges clearly from the German Constitutional Court's firm 
conviction that established falsehoods can be safely denied 
protection without hindrance to the pursuit of truth." Finally, the 
German justification from autonomy is not centered on the 
autonomy of the speakers, as its American counterpart has proven 
to date. Instead, the German justification implies the need to 
strike a balance between rights and duties, between the individual 
and the community, and between the self-expression needs of 
«« W. at 386. 
See id. at 298,305. 
* See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 21 (F.R.G.), translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF 
THE BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW 236 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 
1988). 
See, e.g.. Holocaust Denial Case, 90 BVerfGE 241 (1994). 
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speakers and the self-respect and dignity of listeners. 
The contemporary German constitutional system is grounded 
in an order of objective values, including respect for human dignity 
and perpetual commitment to militant democracy.'®" As such, it 
excludes certain creeds and thus paves the way for content-based 
restrictions on freedom of speech which would be unacceptable 
under American free speech jurisprudence.'®' Undoubtedly, the 
German Basic Law's adoption of certain values and the 
consequent legitimacy of content-based speech regulation 
originated in the deliberate commitment to repudiate the country's 
Nazi past, and to prevent at all costs any possible resurgence of it 
in the future. Within this context, concern with protection of the 
Jewish community and with prevention of any rekindling of 
virulent anti-Semitism within the general population has left a 
definite imprint not only on the constitutional treatment of hate 
speech, but also on the evolution of free speech doctrine more 
generally. 
Evidence of this can be found in the Constitutional Court's 
landmark decision in the 1958 Liith Casel'^ Liith involved an 
appeal to boycott a post-war movie by a director who had been 
popular during the Nazi period as the producer of a notoriously 
anti-Semitic film. Liith, who had advocated the boycott and who 
was an active member of a group seeking to heal the wounds 
between Christians and Jews, was enjoined by a Hamburg court 
from continuing his advocacy of a boycott. He fUed a complaint 
with the Constitutional Court claiming a denial of his free speech 
rights. 
The Constitutional Court upheld Luth's claim and voided the 
injunction against him, noting that he was motivated by 
apprehension that the reemergence of a film director who had 
been identified with Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda might be 
interpreted, especially abroad, "to mean that nothing had changed 
in German cultural life since the National Socialist period 
The Court went on to note that Tilth's concerns were very 
important for Germans as "[njothing has damaged the German 
reputation as much as the cruel Nazi persecution of the Jews. A 
™ Neither Article 1 of the Basic Law which enshrines human dignity nor Article 21 
which establishes militant democracy are subject to amendment and are thus made 
permanent fixtures of the German constitutional order. 
101 5ee, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding hate speech 
prohibition unconstitutional on ground that it promoted viewpoint discrirnination by 
targeting racial hatred, but not hatred against homosexuals). See supra Part II and 
accompanying notes for a discussion of the R.A. V. case. 
102 BverfOE?, 198(1958). 
11® KOMMERS, supra note 94, at 367. 
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crucial interest exists, therefore, in assuring the world that the 
German people have abandoned this attitude... Accordingly, 
in balancing Liith's free speech interests against the film director's 
professional and economic interests, the Court concluded that 
"[wjhere the formation of public opinion on a matter important to 
the general welfare is concerned, private and especially individual 
economic interests must, in principle, yield. 
Germany has sought to curb hate speech with a broad array of 
legal tools. These include criminal and civil laws that protect 
against insult, defamation and other forms of verbal assault, such 
as attacks against a person's honor or integrity, damage to 
reputation, and disparaging the memory of the dead.^°® Although 
the precise legal standards apphcable to the regulation of hate 
speech have evolved over the years,^"^ hate speech against groups, 
and anti-Semitic propaganda in particular, have been routinely 
curbed by the German courts. For example, spreading pamphlets 
charging "the Jews" with numerous crimes and conspiracies, and 
even putting a sticker only saying "Jew" on the election posters of 
a candidate running for office were deemed properly punishable 
by the courts.^"® 
Under current law, criminal liability can be imposed for 
incitement to hatred, or for attacks on human dignity against 
individuals or groups determined by nationality, race, religion, or 
ethnic origin.™ Some of these provisions require showing a threat 
to public peace, while others do not."° But even when such a 
showing is necessary, it imposes a standard that is easily met,"' in 
sharp contrast to the American requirement of proof of an 
incitement to violence. 
Perhaps the most notorious and controversial offshoot of 
Germany's attempts to combat hate speech relate to the 
prohibitions against denying the Holocaust, or to use a hteral 
translation of the German expression, to engage in the "Auschwitz 
lie.'"" Attempts to combat Holocaust denials raise difficult 
questions not only concerning the proper boundaries between fact 
and opinion, but also concerning the limits of academic freedom. 
These issues came before the Constitutional Court in the 
Id. 
105 Id. 
105 See Kiibler, supra note 7, at 340. 
101 For an account of the most important changes, see id. at 340-47. 
10® See id. at 343-44. 
10® See id. at 344. 
110 Id. at 345. 
111 See id. at 344, n.32. 
112 Id. at 344-46. 
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Holocaust Denial Case in 1994."^ This case arose as a consequence 
of an invitation to speak at a public meeting issued by a far right 
political party to David Irving, a revisionist British historian who 
has argued that the mass extermination of Jews during the Third 
Reich never took place. The government conditioned permission 
for the meeting on assurance that Holocaust denial would not 
occur, stating that such denial would amount to "denigration of the 
memory of the dead, criminal agitation, and, most important, 
criminal insult, all of which are prohibited by the Criminal 
Code.""^ Thereupon, the far right party brought a complaint 
alleging an infringement of its freedom of expression rights. 
Relying on the distinction between fact and opinion and 
emphasizing that demonstrably false facts have no genuine role in 
opinion formation, the Constitutional Court upheld the lower 
court's rejection of the complaint. In so doing, the Court cited the 
following passage from the lower court's opinion: 
The historical fact itself, that human beings were singled out 
according to the criteria of the so-called "Nuremberg Laws" 
and robbed of their individuality for the purpose of 
extermination, puts Jews living in the Federal Republic in a 
special, personal relationship vis-a-vis their fellow citizens; what 
happened [then] is also present in this relationship today. It is 
part of their personal self-perception to be understood as part 
of a group of people who stand out by virtue of their fate and in 
relation to whom there is a special moral responsibility on the 
part of all others, and that this is part of their dignity. Respect 
for this self-perception, for each individual, is one of the 
guarantees against repetition of this kind of discrimination and 
forms a basic condition of their lives in the Federal Republic. 
Whoever seeks to deny these events denies vis-a-vis each 
individual the personal worth of [Jewish persons]. For the 
person concerned, this is continuing discrimination against the 
group to which he belongs and, as part of the group, against 
him."^ 
In short, given the special circiunstances involved. Holocaust 
denial is seen as robbing the Jews in Germany of their individual 
and collective identity and dignity, and as threatening to 
undermine the rest of the population's duty to maintain a social 
and pohtical environment in which Jews and the Jewish 
community can feel themselves to be an integral part. 
Holocaust denial in relation to the Jews in Germany presents 
a very special case. But what about the fact/opinion distinction in 
113 90 BVerfGE 241 (1994). 
11'' KOMMERS, supra note 94, at 383. 
115 Id. at 386. 
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other contexts? Or hate speech and insults against other 
individuals or groups? 
The Constitutional Court rendered a controversial decision 
bearing on the fact/opinion distinction in the Historical Fabrication 
CaseP^ That case involved a book claiming that Germany was not 
to be blamed for the outbreak of World War II, as that war was 
thrust upon it by its enemies. The Court held that the book's claim 
amounted to an "opinion"—^albeit a clearly unwarranted one—^and 
was thus within the realm of protected speech."^ While who is to 
blame for the outbreak of the war is clearly more a matter of 
opinion than whether or not the Holocaust took place, the line 
between fact and opinion is by no means as neat as the 
Constitutional Court's jurisprudence suggests. For example, is 
admission of the Holocaust coupled with the claim that the Jews 
brought it on themselves a protected opinion or such a gross 
distortion of the facts as to warrant equating the "opinion" 
involved with assertion of patently false facts? 
Insults linked to false statements targeting groups other than 
Jews was at the core of the Constitutional Court's decision in the 
Tucholsky I Case,™ which dealt with display of a bumper sticker 
on a car with the slogan "soldiers are murderers." The bumper 
sticker in question had been displayed by a social science teacher 
who was a pacifist and who objected to Germany's military role in 
the 1991 Gulf War. Moreover, the above slogan had a long 
pedigree in German history as it was the creation of the writer 
Kurt Tucholsky, an Anti-Nazi pacifist of the 1930s who was 
stripped of his German citizenship in 1933. 
The lower court interpreting the slogan hterally found it to be 
a defamatory incitement to hatred which assaulted the human 
dignity of all soldiers. By asserting that all soldiers are murderers, 
the slogan cast them as unworthy members of the community. 
Based on this analysis, the social science teacher was fined for 
violating the criminal code's prohibition against incitement to 
hatred against an identifiable group within society. 
The Constitutional Court, construing the slogan as an 
expression of opinion, held it to be constitutionally protected 
speech. In so doing, the Court asserted that the slogan should not 
be construed literally. Emphasizing that the slogan had been 
displayed next to a photograph from the Spanish Civil War 
showing a dying soldier who had been hit by a bullet accompanied 
by an inscription of the word "why?"; the Court interpreted the 
90BVerfGEl (1994). 
See KOMMERS, supra note 94, at 387. 
21 EuGRZ 463-65 (1994). 
1554 C ARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:4 
message of the slogan as casting soldiers as much as victims as it 
had as killers. Accordingly, the slogan could be interpreted as an 
appeal to reject militarism, by asking why society forces soldiers— 
who are members of society as everyone else—^to become 
potential murderers and to expose them to becoming victims of 
murder. 
The Constitutional Court's decision provoked an angry 
reaction among politicians, journalists and scholars."' The Court 
revisited the issue as it reviewed other criminal convictions in cases 
involving statements claiming that "soldiers are murderers" or 
"soldiers are potential murderers," in its 1995 Tucholsky II Casel^° 
Noting that the attacks involved were not against any particular 
soldier but against soldiers as agents of the government, the Court 
reiterated that the statements involved amounted to 
constitutionally protected expressions of opinion rather than to the 
spreading of false facts. The Court recognized that public 
institutions deserve protection from attacks that may undermine 
their social acceptance. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the 
right to express political opinions critical or even insulting to 
political institutions, rather than to any segment of the population, 
outweighed the affected institutions' need for protection. 
These two decisions illustrate some of the difficulties involved 
in drawing cogent lines between fact and opinion, and between 
acceptable—and in a democracy indispensable—^political criticism 
and inflammatory excesses threatening the continued viability of 
pubhc institutions. This notwithstanding, in Germany the 
prohibitions against hate speech are firmly grounded. The only 
open questions concern their constitutional boundaries in cases 
that do not involve anti-Semitism or the Holocaust. 
D. International Covenants 
Freedom of speech is protected as a fundamental right under 
all the major international covenants on human rights adopted 
since the end of World War II, such as the 1948 U.N. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,^" the 1966 United Nations 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR),^^^ and the 1950 
See KOMMERS, supra note 94, at 392-93. 
120 Id. at 393. 
121 See BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (Ian Brownlie, Q.C. ed., 3rd ed. 
1992) (setting forth the text for Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights). 
122 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978) (entered into force Mar. 23, 
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).^^^ These 
covenants, however, do not extend protection to all speech, and 
some such as the CCPR specially condemn hate speech2^^ A 
particularly strong stand against hate speech, which includes a 
command to states to criminalize it, is promoted by Article 4 of the 
1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) Article 4 provides in relevant part, 
that: 
State Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations 
which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race 
or group of persons of one color or ethnic origin, or which 
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in 
any form 
[State Parties] shall declare an offence punishable by law all 
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to racial discrimination ... and ^so the provision of 
any assistance to racist activities, including the financing 
thereof.... 
Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations ... and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial 
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such 
organizations or activities as an offense punishable by law 
The United States attached a reservation to its ratification of 
CERD, since compliance with Article 4 would obviously 
contravene current American free speech jurisprudence.^^' 
International bodies charged with judicial review of hate 
speech cases have, by and large, embraced positions that come 
much closer to those prevalent in Germany than to their United 
States counterpart. For example, in Faurisson v. France,^^^ the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee upheld the conviction of 
Faurisson under France's "Gayssot Act" which makes it an offence 
to contest the existence of proven crimes against humanity. 
Faurisson, a French university professor, had promoted the view 
that the gas chambers at Auschwitz and other Nazi camps had not 
been used for the purposes of extermination, and claimed that all 
the people in France knew that "the myth of the gas chambers is a 
dishonest fabrication." 
The Human Rights Committee decided that Faurisson's 
1976). 
European Convention on Human Rights Eind Fundamentcil Freedoms [ECHR], Nov. 
4,1950, art. 10(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
See Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
16,1966, art. 20(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978) 
See Kiibler, supra note 7, at 357. 
126 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 58th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/a58/D/550/1993 (1996). 
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conviction for having violated the rights and reputation of others 
was consistent with the free speech protection afforded by Article 
19 of CCPR. Since Faurisson's statements were prone to foster 
anti-Semitism, their restriction served the legitimate purpose of 
furthering the Jewish community's right "to hve free from fear of 
an atmosphere of anti-[S]emitism." 
Notwithstanding its support for Faurisson's conviction, the 
Human Rights Committee noted that the "Gayssot Act" was 
overly broad in as much as it prohibited publication of bona fide 
historical research which would tend to contradict some of the 
conclusions arrived at the Nuremberg trials. Thus, whereas 
suppression of demonstrably false facts likely to kindle hatred is 
consistent with United Nations standards, suppression of plausible 
factual claims or of opinions based on such facts would not be 
justified even if it happened to lead to increased anti-Semitism. 
The European Court of Human Rights has also upheld 
convictions for hate speech as consistent with the free speech 
guarantees provided by Article 10 of the ECHR. An interesting 
case in point is Jersild v. Denmark}^ The Danish courts had 
upheld the convictions of members of a racist youth group who 
had made derogatory and degrading remarks against immigrants, 
calling them among other things, "niggers" and "animals," and 
that of a television journalist who had interviewed the youths in 
question and broadcast their views in the course of a television 
documentary that he had edited. The journalist appealed his 
conviction to the European Court, which unanimously stated that 
the convictions of the youths had been consistent with ECHR 
standards, but which by a twelve to seven vote held that the 
journalist's conviction violated the standards in question. 
The convictions of the youths for having treated a segment of 
the population as being less than human were consistent with the 
limitations on free speech for "the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others" imposed by Article 10 of the ECHR.^^^ The 
conviction of the joumahst for aiding and abetting the youths had 
been premised on the finding that the broadcast had given wide 
publicity to views that would otherwise have reached but a very 
small audience, thus exacerbating the harm against the targets of 
the hate message. The European Court's majority stressed that 
the journalist had not endorsed the message of his racist 
interviewees; and had tried to expose them and their message in 
terms of their social milieu, their frustrations, their propensity to 
App. No. 15890/89,19 Eur. Q. H.R. Rep. 1 (1995) (Commission report). 
See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms fECHRl 
Nov. 4,1950, art. 10(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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violence and their criminal records as posing important questions 
of public concern; concluding that conviction had been 
disproportionate in relation to the permissible aim of protecting 
the rights and reputations of the target group because the 
journalists had no intent of promoting hatred, the legitimacy of his 
conviction turned on a balancing of his expression rights in 
reporting facts and conveying opinions about them and the harms 
imposed by the hate message on its targets. Both the majority and 
the dissenters on the European Court agreed that balancing was 
the proper approach. They disagreed, however, eoncerning how 
much weight should be borne by the competing interests involved. 
From the standpoint of the dissenters, the majority placed too 
much weight on the journalist's expression rights and too little on 
the protection of the dignity of the victims of hatred. The 
dissenters emphasized the fact that the journalist had edited down 
the interviews to the point of principally highlighting the racial 
slurs, and that he had at no point in the documentary expressed 
disapproval or condemnation of the statements uttered by his 
interviewees. 
In the end, the disagreements between the majority and the 
dissent in Jersild center on the proper interpretation to be given to 
the general tenor of the documentary and to the attitude displayed 
in it by the journalist through his interviews and reports. 
Accordingly, just as it became plain in the context of hate speech 
regulation in Germany, prohibitions against crude insults and 
patently false statements of fact generally seem legally 
manageable. On the other hand, issues depending on opinions or 
on drawing the often elusive line between fact and opinion, 
present much more troubling questions. With this in mind and in 
hght of the different approaches to hate speech outlined above, it 
is now time to explore how best to deal with hate speech in the 
context of contemporary constitutional concerns. 
IV. CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES OF HATE SPEECH IN 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: 
OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS 
The preceding analysis reveals that protection of hate speech 
as well as its prohibition raise serious and difficult problems. Not 
all hate speech is alike, and its consequences may vary from one 
setting to another. Furthermore, to the extent that hate speech 
produces harms that are not immediate, these may be uncertain 
and hard to measure. The impact of hate speech also seems to 
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depend to a significant extent on the medium of its 
communication. Thus, an oral communication to a relatively small 
audience at Speakers' Corner in London's Hyde Park should not 
be automatically lumped together with a posting on the Internet 
available worldwide on the web. 
The two contrasting approaches to hate speech adopted by 
the United States and by other Western democracies each has 
certain advantages and drawbacks. The main advantage of the 
American approach is that it makes for relatively clear cut 
boundaries between permissible and impermissible speech. And, 
at least in cases in which hate speech poses little threat to its 
targets and its message is repudiated by an overwhelming majority 
of its non-target audience, as in the Skokie case, tolerance may be 
preferable. Indeed in that case, the dangers stemming from 
suppression and possible spread underground of hate speech 
would seem to outweigh the harm from unconstrained 
communication. 
The chief disadvantage of the American approach is that it is 
not attuned to potentially serious harms that may unfold gradually 
over time or have their greatest immediate impact in remote 
places. In addition, the American approach tends to remain blind 
to the considerable potential harm that hate speech can cause to 
the equahty and dignity concerns of its victims or the attitudes and 
beliefs of non-target audiences. The latter groups may reject the 
explicit appeal to hate but nonetheless be influenced by the more 
diffuse implicit message lurking beneath the surface of that 
appeal.'^' 
The principal advantage to the approach to hate speech 
prevalent outside the United States is that it makes for 
unequivocal condemnation of it as morally repugnant, and at least 
in some cases, such as in the United Kingdom's efforts against the 
spread of fascist hate propaganda discussed above, it can play an 
important role in the struggle against extremist anti-democratic 
political movements. Furthermore, as exemplified by 
contemporary Germany's steadfast and continuous pursuit against 
anti-Semitic hate propaganda, vigorous prohibition and 
enforcement can bolster the security, dignity, autonomy and well 
being of the target community while at the same time reminding 
non-target groups and society at large that the hate message at 
129 This may have occurred for many whites in connection with the RA.V. case. See 
discussion supra note 101. These whites most likely found the cross burning repugnant, 
but nonetheless did not want to live in a racially mixed neighborhood. They may even 
have hidden that belief from themselves by rationalizing that it is better to have a racially 
segregated neighborhood to avoid the kind of ugly violence exemplified by cross burning. 
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stake is not only repugnant and unacceptable, but that it will not 
be tolerated, and that those who are bent on spreading it will be 
punished. 
The principal disadvantages to the approach to hate speech 
under consideration, on the other hand, are: that it inevitably has 
to confront difficult line drawing problems, such as that between 
fact and opinion in the context of the German scheme of 
regulation; that when prosecution of perpetrators of hate speech 
fails, such as in the British Southern News case discussed above,^^" 
regulation may unwittingly do more to legitimate and to 
disseminate the hate propaganda at issue than a complete absence 
of regulation would have;"^ that prosecutions may be too selective 
or too indiscriminate owing to (often rmconscious) biases 
prevalent among law enforcement officials, as appears to have 
been the case in the prosecutions of certain black activists under 
the British Race Relations Act;"^ and, that since not all that may 
appear to be hate speech actually is hate speech—such as the 
documentary report involved in Jersild}^^ or a play in which a racist 
character engages in hate speech, but the dramatist intends to 
convey an anti-hate message—^regulation of that speech may 
unwisely bestow powers of censorship over legitimate pohtical, 
literary and artistic expression to government officials and judges. 
In the last analysis, none of the existing approaches to hate 
speech are ideal, but on balance the American seems less 
satisfactory than its alternatives. Above all, the American 
approach seems significantly flawed in some of its assumptions, in 
its impact and in the message it conveys concerning the evils 
surrounding hate speech. In terms of assumptions, the American 
approach either underestimates the potential for harm of hate 
speech that is short of incitement to violence, or it overestimates 
the potential of rational deliberation as a means to neutralize calls 
to hate. In terms of impact, given its long history of racial 
tensions, it is surprising that the United States does not exhibit 
greater concern for the injuries to security, dignity, autonomy and 
well being which officially tolerated hate speech causes to its black 
minority. Likewise, America's hate speech approach seems to 
unduly discount the pernicious impact that racist hate speech may 
See supra note 85. 
This disadvantage should not be overestimated, however. Indeed, if most 
prosecutions against a certain type of hate succeed and only a few fail, then conceivably 
prohibition may on the whole be preferable to freedom spread through lack of regulation. 
132 See Race Relations Act, 1976 (Eng.), cited in D.J. WALKER & MICHAEL J. 
REDMAN, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
RACE RELATIONS ACT OF 1976 passim (1977). 
133 App. No. 15890/89,19 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 1 (1995) (Commission report). 
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have on lingering or dormant racist sentiments still harbored by a 
non-negligible segment of the white population."" Furthermore, 
even if we discount the domestic impact of hate speech, given the 
worldwide spread of locally produced hate speech, such as in the 
case of American manufactured Neo-Nazi propaganda 
disseminated through the worldwide web, a strong argument can 
be made that American courts should factor in the obvious and 
serious foreign impact of certain domestic hate speech in 
determining whether such speech should be entitled to 
constitutional protection. Finally, in terms of the message 
conveyed by refusing to curb most hate speech, the American 
approach looms as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
tolerance of hate speech in a country in which democracy has been 
solidly entrenched since independence over two hundred years ago 
conveys a message of confidence against both the message and the 
prospects of those who endeavor to spread hate."^ On the other 
hand, tolerance of hate speech in a country with serious and 
enduring race relations problems may reinforce racism and 
hamper full integration of the victims of racism within the broader 
community."® 
The argument in favor of opting for greater regulation of hate 
speech than that provided in the United States rests on several 
important considerations, some related to the place and function 
of free speech in contemporary constitutional democracies, and 
others to the dangers and problems surrounding hate speech. 
Typically, contemporary constitutional democracies are 
increasingly diverse, multiracial, multicultural, multireligious and 
multilingual. Because of this and because of increased migration, 
a commitment to pluralism and to respect of diversity seem 
inextricably linked to vindication of the most fundamental 
individual and collective rights. Increased diversity is prone to 
making social cohesion more precarious, thus, if anything, 
exacerbating the potential evils of hate speech. Contemporary 
democratic states, on the other hand, are less prone to curtailing 
134 In this connection, it is significant that following a steep rise in racist incidents 
involving hate speech on university campuses throughout the United States, several 
universities, including the University of Michigan and Stanford University adopted 
regulations against hate speech. These were, however, struck down as unconstitutiond by 
lower courts because they restricted speech falling short of the incitement to violence 
standard. See Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); ODiry v. 
Stanford, No. 74039 (Cal. Super. Q. Santa Clara Co. Feb., 27, 1995) (applying 
constitutional standard incorporated in state law and made applicable to private 
imiversities). 
133 This is the view defended in BOLLINGER, supra note 18. 
136 For a discussion of the uses of tolerance of hate speech to promote existing racism, 
see Rosenfeld, supra note 55, at 1457,1487. 
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free speech rights than their predecessors either because of deeper 
implantation of the democratic ethos or because respect of 
supranational norms has become inextricably linked to continued 
membership in supranational alliances that further vital national 
interests. 
In these circumstances, contemporary democracies are more 
likely to find themselves in a situation like stage four in the context 
of the American experience with free speech rather than in one 
that more closely approximates a stage one experience."^ In other 
words, to drown out minority discourse seems a much greater 
threat than government prompted censorship in contemporary 
constitutional democracies that are pluralistic. Actually, viewed 
more closely, contemporary pluralistic democracies tend to be in a 
situation that combines the main features of stage two and stage 
four. Thus, the main threats to full fledged freedom of expression 
would seem to come primarily from the "tyranny of the majority" 
as reflected both within the government and without, and from the 
dominance of majority discourses at the expense of minority ones. 
If it is true that majority conformity and the dominance of its 
discourse pose the greatest threat to uninhibited self-expression 
and unconstrained political debate in a contemporary pluralist 
polity, then significant regulation of hate speech seems justified. 
This is not only because hate speech obviously inhibits the self-
expression and oopportunity of inclusion of its victims, but also, 
less obviously, because hate speech tends to bear closer links to 
majority views than might initially appear. Indeed, in a 
multicultural society, while crude insults uttered by a member of 
the majority directed against a minority may be unequivocally 
rejected by almost all other members of the majority culture, the 
concerns that led to the hate message may be widely shared by the 
majority culture who regard of other cultures as threats to their 
way of life. In those circumstances, hate speech might best be 
characterized as a pathological extension of majority feelings or 
beliefs. 
So long as the pluralist contemporary state is committed to 
maintaining diversity, it cannot simply embrace a value neutral 
mindset, and consequently it cannot legitimately avoid engaging in 
some minimum of viewpoint discrimination. This is made clear by 
the German example, and although the German experience has 
been unique, it is hard to imagine that any pluralist constitutional 
democracy would not be committed to a similar position, albeit to 
a lesser degree."** Accordingly, without adopting German free 
™ See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying test. 
This includes even the United States, which for all its professed commitment to a 
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speech jurisprudence, at a minimum contemporary pluralist 
democracy ought to institutionalize viewpoint discrimination 
against the crudest and most offensive expressions of racism, 
rehgious bigotry and virulent bias on the basis of ethnic or national 
origin. 
Rejection of a content-neutral approach to speech does not 
contravene the four philosophical justifications of free speech 
discussed above, but it does somewhat alter the nature and scope 
of speech protected under some of them. In terms of the 
justification from democracy, whereas tolerating hate speech is not 
inherently at odds with maintaining a free speech regime 
compatible with the flow of ideas required to sustain a well 
functioning democracy, it is inconsistent with the smooth 
functioning of a democracy marked by an unswerving commitment 
to pluralism. Accordingly, either the justification from democracy 
is regarded as constrained by the need to sustain pluralism, or 
conceived as linked to a particular kind of democracy grounded on 
pluralism. In either case, in a polity committed to pluralism, hate 
speech could not conceivably contribute in any legitimate way to 
democracy. 
A similar argument can be advanced in relation to the 
justification from social contract. Either commitment to pluralism 
is not subject to alteration through agreement, or it is assumed that 
preservation of basic individual and collective dignity is in the self-
interest of every contractor, and thus not prone to being bargained 
away in the course of agreeing to any viable pact. Consequently, 
hate speech could be safely banned without affecting the integrity 
of the social contract justification. 
In view of the earlier discussion of the justification from 
autonomy,"' it is obvious that it goes hand in hand with a ban 
against hate speech so long as the autonomy of speakers and 
listeners is given equal weight. In other words, if autonomy is 
taken as requiring dignity and reciprocity, then it demands 
banning hate speech as an affront against the basic rights of its 
targets. 
free speech jurisprudence anchored on viewpoint neutrality, has in certain cases upheld 
restrictions on speech that seem based on viewpoint bias. See, e.g., Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 544-45 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (characterizing clearly 
political speech of members of the Communist Party advocating—but not inciting to 
violence or creating any imminent present danger of—the violent overthrow of the 
government as speech that ranks "low" "on any scale of values which we have hitherto 
recognized"). This confuses the category of speech involved, namely political speech, 
which has traditionally been ranked as the highest, and the content of the speech, which 
had been indeed rejected as repugnant by the vast majority of Americans. 
See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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Unlike the above justifications, the pursuit of truth does not 
depend on whether or not one embraces plurahsm. Nevertheless, 
if one rejects the presumptions made by Mill and Holmes, the 
banning of hate speech can be amply reconciled with commitment 
to the pursuit of truth. The justification for rejecting the Millean 
and Holmesian presumptions has been persuasively made by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in the Keegstra case discussed above.^^ 
Moreover, banning definitively proven falsehoods, such as 
unequivocal denial of the Holocaust, cannot conceivably hinder 
pursuit of the truth. 
Opinion based hate speech may not be as convincingly 
dismissed, but it is difficult to see how hate speech in form could 
contribute to furthering the truth. The same cannot automatically 
be said about the broader message lurking beneath hate-based 
opinion. Thus a racist belief or opinion may be based on fears or 
concerns which may not themselves be worthless from the 
standpoint of pursuit of the truth. For example, sentiments against 
recent immigrants belonging to different races or cultures may 
stem from fears of challenges against one's economic security and 
cultural values. Whether and to what degree such fears may be 
warranted are certainly questions which ought to be freely 
discussed from the standpoint of pursuit of the truth. Consistent 
with this, special caution should be exercised when dealing with 
what appears to be hate speech in substance, but is not hate speech 
in form. 
From a theoretical standpoint, it is quite possible to draw a 
bright line between fears and concerns and racist animus. Arguing 
that immigration from a former colony should be curtailed because 
it will result in a loss of jobs among the natives and result in 
undesired changes in the local culture is certainly distinguishable 
from the hate message that the immigrants in question are 
"animals" who should be shipped back to their country of ori^n,^'i 
even if one recognizes that the former message is imphcitly 
incorporated into the latter. Because of the ambiguity and 
openness to several inconsistent interpretations of some messages 
which may plausibly amount to hate speech in substance, the 
above mentioned line may not always be easy to draw in practice. 
As we shall examine below, that standing alone does not afford a 
good reason for tolerating all opinion-based hate speech. In short, 
whether couched as hate speech in form or as hate speech in 
See supra Part III. A and accompanying notes for a discussion of the Keegstra case. 
Cf. Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, 19 Eur. Q. H.R. Rep. 1 (1995) 
(Commission report). For a discussion of Jersild, see supra Part III.D and accompanying 
notes. 
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substance, expressions of racial animus do not advance the search 
for the truth and thus do not call for protection from the 
standpoint of the justification from pursuit of the truth."^ 
Although consistent with the four philosophical justifications 
of freedom of speech, to become fully acceptable from a practical 
standpoint, regulation of hate speech must cope satisfactorily with 
the vexing problems identified in our review of current regulation 
outside the United States. The principal problems encountered 
involve line drawing, bias, difficulties in interpretation leading to 
suppression of speech deserving of protection and/or to toleration 
of certain hate messages, and facihtation of government or 
majority driven censorship. 
Most of these problems are raised in the prevalent American 
criticism against regulation based on the so called "shppery slope" 
argument.^"^ Pursuant to this argument, since it is impossible to 
draw neat hnes imposing verifiable constraints on judges and 
legislators, once the door to regulation is open ever so slightly it is 
bound gradually to open wider, eventually allowing for censorship 
of all kinds of legitimate yet unpopular speech. Accordingly, 
failure to confront the "slippery slope" problem may lead to 
dangerous erosion of free speech. 
Unless one adopts a Holmesian view of speech,^"^ the 
"slippery slope" argument is largely unpersuasive, and this seems 
particularly true in the context of hate speech. Indeed, in many 
cases, such as those involving Holocaust denial, cross burning, 
displaying swastikas, and calling immigrants "animals," there do 
not appear to be any line drawing problems. These cases involve 
clearly recognizable expressions of hate which constitute patent 
assaults against the dignity of those whom they target, and which 
fly in the face of even a cursory commitment to pluralism. On the 
other hand, there are cases of statements, which some groups may 
find objectionable or offensive, but which raise genuine factual or 
value based issues, and which ought therefore be granted 
protection. For example, strong criticism of the Pope for his 
opposition to contraception and to homosexual relationships as 
being "indifferent to human suffering caused by overpopulation 
and an enemy of human dignity for all" may be highly offensive to 
Catholics, but even in a country where Catholics are a religious 
minority should clearly not be officially censored, punished or 
In this connection, it is important to distinguish between expression of racial animus 
and reporting such animus. Conveying information concerning whether one is a racist, as 
opposed to uttering racial epithets, can of course contribute to discovery of the truth. 
See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985). 
See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
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characterized as hate speech. 
There is of course a gray area between these two fairly clear 
cut areas, in which there are difficult line drawing problems, as 
exemplified by the German controversy over the claim that 
"soldiers are murderers."''*^ Line drawing problems, however, are 
quite common in law as they tend to arise whenever a scheme of 
regulation attempts to draw a balance among competing 
objectives. Such line drawing problems may well be exacerbated 
when a fundamental right like free speech is involved, but that 
justifies, at most, deregulating the entire gray area, not toleration 
of all hate speech falling short of incitement to violence. 
In the last analysis, the best way to deal with the problems 
likely to arise in connection with regulation of hate speech is to 
approach them consistent with a set of fundamental normative 
principles, and in light of key contextual variables. In other words, 
the standards of constitutionally permissible regulation of hate 
speech should conform to fundamental principles that transcend 
geographical, cultural and historical differences,"® and at the same 
time remain sufficiently open to accommodate highly relevant 
historical and cultural variables. The fixed principles involved are 
openness to pluralism and respect for the most elementary degree 
of autonomy, equahty, dignity and reciprocity."' The variables, on 
the other hand, include the particular history and nature of 
discrimination, status as minority or majority group, customs, 
common linguistic practices, and the relative power or 
powerlessness of speakers and their targets within the society 
involved. 
To minimize difficulties and to reduce the possibility of bias, 
regulation of hate speech should focus on efforts to reconcile the 
fixed principles and the relevant variables. This focus should 
determine, among other things, how far within the gray area 
regulation should extend. Thus, for example, given their different 
historical experiences with anti-Semitism, it seems reasonable that 
See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying test. 
That does not necessarily mean that these are universal, only that they ought to be 
common to contemporary pluralist constitutional democracies. For a more extended 
discussion of the question of universalism of human rights, see Michel Rosenfeld, Can 
Human Rights Bridge the Gap Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism? A Pluralist 
Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249 (1999). 
This standard establishes a bare minimum which seems adequate in the context of 
speech regulation, but not in that of government policy. For example, this standard would 
allow for criticism of a particular religion on the grounds it is too restrictive, an enemy of 
progress, or indifferent to the rights of women. While these statements may offend 
believers, it cannot be fairly said that they deprive them of the most elementary degree of 
dignity. However, a government policy attacking such religion, or making it difficult for 
its adherents to freely practice it would require meeting a much higher standard. 
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Germany should go further than the United States in prohibiting 
anti-Semitic speech that falls within the gray area. Although 
American and German Jews are entitled to the same degree of 
dignity and inclusion within their respective societies, greater 
restrictions on anti-Semitism are required in Germany than in the 
United States in order to achieve comparable results. 
Recourse to the above mentioned approach is also likely to 
minimize bias in the regulation of hate speech. One way in which 
this can be achieved is by taking into account historically 
significant differences between the proponents and intended 
targets of hate messages. Thus, racist speech by a member of a 
historically dominant race against members of an oppressed race 
are hkely to have a more severe impact than racist speech by the 
racially oppressed against their oppressors. Even if this does not 
justify selective regulation of hate speech, it does call for greater 
leniency when the racially oppressed is at fault, and for taking into 
account as a mitigating factor the fact—^found in some of the 
British cases discussed above'''®—that the racist speech of a 
member of an oppressed racial group was in response to the racism 
perpetrated by members of the oppressor race. Furthermore, if 
these contextual variables are properly accounted for, it becomes 
less hkely that majority biases will dominate prosecutorial or 
judicial decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Hate speech raises difficult questions that test the limits of 
free speech. Although none of the constitutional regimes 
examined in these pages leaves hate speech unregulated, there are 
vast differences between the minimal regulation practiced in the 
United States and the much more extensive regulation typical of 
other countries and of international covenants. Both approaches 
are imperfect, but in a world that has witnessed the Holocaust, 
various other genocides and ethnic cleansing, ah of which were 
surrounded by abundant hate speech, the American way seems 
definitely less appealing than its alternatives. As hate speech can 
now almost instantaneously spread throughout the world, and as 
nations become increasingly socially, ethnically, religiously and 
culturally diverse, the need for regulation becomes ever more 
urgent. In view of these important changes the state can no longer 
justify commitment to neutrality, but must embrace pluralism. 
See discussion supra Part III.B and accompanying notes. 
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guarantee autonomy and dignity, and strive for maintenance of a 
minimum of mutual respect. Commitment to these values requires 
states to conduct an active struggle against hate speech, while at 
the same time avoiding the pitfalls bound to be encountered in the 
pursuit of that struggle. It would of course be preferable if hate 
could be defeated by reason. But since unfortunately that has 
failed all too often, there seems no alternative but to combat hate 
speech through regulation in order to secure a minimum of civility 
in the public arena. 
